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Coleridge’s Failed Quest:
The Anticlimax of Fancy/Imagination in
Biographia Literaria
Eugene L. Stelzig
SUNY Geneseo
He began anywhere: you put some question to him, made some sugges
tive observation: instead of answering this, or decidedly setting out
towards answer
he would accumulate formidable apparatus, logical
swim-bladders, transcendental life-preservers and other precautionary
and vehiculatory gear, for setting out; perhaps did at last get underway,
— but was swiftly solicited, turned aside by the glance of some radiant
new game on this hand or that, into new courses; and ever into new, and
before long into all the Universe,
it was uncertain what game you
would catch, or whether any.

Carlyle, “Portraits of His Contemporaries”
I
T. S. Eliot’ assertion in a 1956 lecture still represents the contem
porary consensus: “the criticism of to-day... may be said to be in direct
descent from Coleridge.”1 Coleridge is the founding father of modern
Anglo-American criticism, even if at times he did no more than intro
duce the currency of German idealism, sometimes passed off as his
own, into the vaults of English thought. Indeed, could it be seriously
argued that any concept at the back of modern criticism has been as
important as Coleridge’s imagination theory? And this brings me to
the subject of my essay: if the famous conclusion of the first volume of
the Biographia is a touchstone of modern criticism, the regularity
with which it is anthologized demonstrates something about the
reception of Coleridge’ testament of his literary
Biographia Lit
eraria is known largely for a few scattered passages of practical
criticism and for a number of brilliant but difficult definitions of a
philosophical/aesthetic nature. Coleridge’ method, or lack of it, in
his literary quasi-autobiography encourages such an approach (he
himself called it “so immethodical a miscellany”2) but the miscellane
ous, excerpting approach signally distorts the true character of his
essay. The context of questioning and uncertainty in which his
thought-formulae are imbedded is overlooked, and the well-known
phrases are made to function with a finality which the open-minded
and ever-hesitant Coleridge may not have intended, and which,
moreover, is not warranted by the overall tenor of the work. There is
something paradoxical about such a treatment of a thinker one of
whose basic aesthetic premises is “organic form.” To dissever parts of
the Biographia is to deny in practice Coleridge’s vitalist aesthetics: “a
living body is of necessity an organized
— and what is organiza-
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tion but the connection of parts to a whole, so that each part is at once
end and means.”3
In the following pages I wish to re-embody the most famous and
most frequently severed part, the fancy-imagination distinction, and
to examine the relationship of part to whole which in Coleridge’ own
terms is tantamount to seeing the “organization” of the work for what
it is. An open-minded reading of this work in terms of its overall
structure must admit that it contains not only the highlights of
impressive insight but also elements of the absurd. The author of
Biographia Literaria is something of a literary prankster and escape
artist: Coleridge on imagination has been taken too seriously by most
modern scholars and critics.4 Instead of radically over- or underesti
mating his true stature, we are starting to see the Inquiring Spirit in a
truer perspective. From his earliest ventures in poetry and prose to the
grand mirage of the Logosophia or grand synthesis that kept always
receding just beyond the horizons of the possible during his final
decade, the gap between promise and performance in Coleridge’ life
and works is so large that it makes him a unique figure among major
English writers. Whatever unity the Biographia Literaria may have is
not to be found in the execution of the work, which is pretentiously,
albeit feebly, propped up from the start to collapse disastrously by the
end of volume I. The deeper, Romantic coherence of the book lies in the
conception only. The conception, indeed, is as magnificent as the
execution is bungled. Like Hamlet, Coleridge here has that within
which passes show. It does not see the light of day, although Coleridge
makes a number of grandiloquent gestures in the attempt to deliver
the goods he has promised — and promised, and promised. The author
of the Biographia struts self-importantly to the center of the stage; he
informs his audience that he has come to tell them all, but shortly
before the climax of his presentation, he makes a clumsy exit. The
conception behind Coleridge’ discussion of imagination merges into
infinite spaces, the performance can be bounded in a nutshell. As in
the drama of Hamlet, whose character Coleridge understood more
fully than any other, including his own, delay, postponement and
anticlimax are the typical features of his mind and art.

II
Coleridge dictated the Biographia between July and September
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1815 as a preface to a new edition of his poems. It soon turned into an
informal meditation on characteristic themes that can be summed up
under the word, imagination, which is the central idea pervading the
book. Volume I is meant to lead up to and culminate with a detailed
philosophical presentation of a theory of imagination, and volume II
is designed to ground the theory back in the actual, and the abstract in
the concrete, through its close examination of Wordsworth’ poetry: to
Coleridge, Wordsworth is the chief modern poet whose works will give
a local habitation and a name to that “plastic power” obscurely
hymned in Biographia Literaria. Thus the two volumes are meant to
complement, and in a sense, complete one another. Coleridge had been
thinking about imagination for a decade and a half before his attempt
to define it in the Biographia. The first mention of the fancy
imagination distinction occurs in a well-known letter of 1802: “Fancy,
or the aggregating Faculty of the mind — not Imagination, or the
modifying, and co-adunating Faculty.”5 Typically, Coleridge defers
the exposition of one of his leading notions for so long that when he
does get around to the task, it has become such a burden that his heart
sinks under him, and he feels compelled to arm himself with much
prefatory matter, only to suffer a decisive failure of nerve when the
momentous encounter can no longer be postponed. What a trickster he
can be in his peregrinations on the road to imagination! Certainly his
introductory paragraph is not reliable but positively misleading as an
indication of the “motives of the present work”:
It has been
lot have had
name introduced, both in conversation
and in print, more frequently than I find it easy to explain, whether I
consider the fewness, unimportance and limited circulation of my writ
ings, or the retirement and distance in which have lived, both from the
literary and political world. Most
it has been
with some
charge which I could not acknowledge, some principle which had
never entertained. Nevertheless, had had no other
or incite
ment, the reader would not have been troubled with this exculpation.
What my additional purposes were will be
in the following pages. It
will be found that the least of what have written concerns myself
personally. I have used the narration
for the purposes of giving
continuity the work, in part
the sake of miscellaneous reflections
suggested me by particular events; but still more as introductory to the
statement of my principles in politics, religion and philosophy, and the
application of the rules deduced from philosophical principles to
and criticism. But of the objects which I have proposed to myself, it was
not the least important to effect, as far as possible, a settlement of the
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long-continued controversy concerning the true nature of poetic diction,
and at the same time to define with utmost impartiality the real poetic
character
the poet by whose writings this controversy was first
kindled and has been since fuelled and fanned (Biographia Literaria, p.
1).

In view of the actual contents of the book, this introduction is a
curious hodge-podge. After a note of exaggerated humility, the author
suggests that he is going to attempt a defense of his life and works. But
then he gives himself a blank check as far as other “purposes” are
concerned. The effusion of authorial benevolence is followed with the
claim that he is going to use an autobiographical format to give
narrative continuity to his book. The psychogenetic method will allow
him to suggest miscellaneous topics (again the blank check) as well as
lead up to a statement of his principles in politics, religion, and philo
sophy. But where in the Biographia is there any such comprehensive
statement? And can anyone claim in good conscience that he
“deduced” from philosophical principles the “application of rules” to
poetry and criticism? Coleridge has again confounded intention with
achievement. Only the last sentence is valid as summary, for in the
second volume he does produce a discussion of the “controversy con
cerning the true nature of poetic diction,” as well as what is in some
respects still the best analysis of “the real poetic character of
Wordsworth.”
The inaccuracy of the opening, which claims at once too much and
not enough, and which provides only a confused focus on the chapters
that follow, may serve as an index of Coleridge’ erratic procedure in
the Biographia generally. His statement of “motives” fails in fact to
mention his fundamental concern with the theory of imagination.
This does not surface until Chapter IV, where it is acknowledged that
Wordsworth’s poetry first led Coleridge to those repeated meditations
which paved the way for the fancy-imagination distinction. What first
struck him so forcibly in Wordsworth’ poetry “was the union of deep
feeling with profound thought; the fine balance of truth in observing
with the imaginative faculty in modifying the objects observed....” (p.
48) Coleridge goes on to say that “repeated meditations” on “this
excellence, which in all
Wordsworth’ writings is more or less
predominant and which constitutes the character of his mind... led me
first to suspect... that fancy and imagination were two distinct and
widely different faculties, instead of being, according to the general
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belief, either two names with one meaning, or at furthest the lower and
higher degree of one and the same power.” (pp. 49-50)
Coleridge’s “first and most important point” is his desire to
“desynonymize ... two conceptions perfectly distinct [fancy
imagination] ... confused under one and the same word.” Thus only in
Chapter IV does he come around to the real subject of Volume I.
Through the systematic discrimination of fancy from imagination
“the theory of the fine arts and of poetry in particular could not... but
derive some additional and important light. It would in its immediate
effects furnish a torch of guidance to the philosophical critic, and
ultimately to the poet himself.” (p. 51) With a peculiar blend of vanity
and humility, Coleridge adds that “metaphysics and psychology have
long been my hobbyhorse,” and that “there was a time, certainly, in
which I took some little credit to myself in the belief that I had been the
first of my countrymen who had pointed out the diverse meaning of
which the two terms were capable and analysed the faculties to which
they should be appropriated.” We are to appreciate that STC is an
original thinker: he has already informed us that he got his basic
insight from reading Wordsworth’s poetry, but he wishes to make it
plain that the fancy-imagination theory is not indebted more directly
than that to the author of the Preface to Lyrical Ballads:
The explanation which Mr. Wordsworth has himself given will be found
to
mine chiefly, perhaps, as our objects are different.... it was
Mr. Wordsworth’s purpose to consider the influences of fancy and imagi
nation as they are manifested in poetry, and from the different effects to
conclude their diversity in kind;
it is my object to investigate the
seminal principle, and then from the kind to deduce the degree. My friend
has drawn a masterly sketch of the branches with their poetic fruitage. I
wish to add the trunk, and even the
as far as they lift themselves
the ground and are visible the naked eye of our common con
sciousness (p. 52).

Clearly Coleridge intends to get to the bottom of this matter in a
way that nobody has ever done before. And so, at the conclusion of
Chapter IV he begins to gird up his loins for the encounter with
Imagination. He winds up the chapter with a curious array of self
serving disclaimers, warnings, and equivocations (pp. 52-53), the
upshot being that he has committed himself to “this labour” of for
mally expounding his theory. Like Wordsworth at the end of Book I of
The Prelude, Coleridge has finally adumbrated his true subject. He is
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big with its conception; he will give us the hard “deductions” that will
either produce fundamental conviction or be capable of fundamental
confutation. The road lies plain before him. Or does it?

III
As the puzzled readers of Biographia Literaria can testify, it does
not. With the first step the philosopher-poet takes toward his theory,
he begins stepping away from it. Caught in an expository dilemma, he
fails at first to recognize that he is approaching the subject from a
tangent that will eventually get him side-tracked in a maze of his own
myriad-mindedness. In Chapter V Coleridge recoils so that he may
strike the better, but in subsequent chapters he keeps recoiling farther
and farther, to the point that when he finally decides to take up his
central argument “on the imagination” he is exhausted and out of
striking distance — the recoil has become a rout. The chief impasse
Coleridge finds himself in is that he feels compelled to acquaint his
readers with the philosophical territory he has traversed on the road
to imagination. He has already acknowledged Wordsworth’ poetry
as a catalyst, but he has not yet mentioned David Hartley’s associa
tional psychology, Coleridge’ reaction to which is the second major
influence on the genesis of his theory. So at the beginning of Chapter
he proceeds to trace his philosophical debts, and in so doing loses
sight of his primary objective and, like an overzealous historian, falls
into the psychogenetic trap of regressive recapitulation. Once Cole
ridge has succumbed to this, his exposition of imagination is lost, at
least for the present, because he cheers himself up with the illusion of
finishing it — like “Christabel” and “Kubla Khan” —- at some more
auspicious time.
Coleridge could have accounted for the importance of his obliga
tions to Hartley in a few pages, but instead he drifts off for three
chapters on a tedious disquisition, beginning with “the law of associa
tion — Its history traced from Aristotle to Hartley.” This title is the
beginning of the end: ostensibly projected as a bridge to his imagina
tion theory, the discussion will turn into a catch-all. It is too bad for
Coleridge and his readers that he succumbs to a Shandyan retrogres
sion. Doubtless, his initial enchantment with and subsequent reaction
against Hartley’ system is crucial to an understanding of the devel
opment of his concept of the imagination. His valid intention is to
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demonstrate that associationist psychology is inapplicable to the
higher reaches of the mind. In striving to trace the history of associa
tionism from Aristotle to its authoritative modern version in Hartley’s
Observations on Man (1749) that had enlisted the young Coleridge’s
enthusiastic allegiance, he is trying to undermine the radical empiri
cal foundations of eighteenth-century English psychology that in
Hartley’ source-book accounted for all mental and emotional pro
cesses through the law of the association of ideas. Coleridge’ even
tual reaction against Hartleyan psychology helped him as much as
his reading of Wordsworth’ poetry in evolving his concept of the
imagination because he came to perceive that associational psychol
ogy mistakes a part of the mind for the whole. The fancy-imagination
distinction is founded on the insight that Hartley’s mind-picture is
reductive because applicable only to lower thought-processes, which
may be adequately understood under the mode of fancy, “the aggrega
tive and associative power.” What Coleridge calls fancy English phi
losophers from Hobbes and Locke on up to the eighteenth-century
psychologists had equated with imagination. Coleridge wished to
desynonymize the words because the lower mode of fancy is not ade
quate to explain the genesis and production of a work of art, which
depends on imagination or the “shaping and modifying power.”
Fancy is nothing but memory emancipated from the order of time
and space” and “must receive all its materials ready made from the
law of association.” But the (esemplastic) Romantic imagination can
not be summed up in such limited terms, because it does not receive
sense impressions passively (the empirical model), but actively trans
forms them into something wondrous, rich, and strange (the idealist
model). For Coleridge, in short, the laws of imagination begin to
operate only on a level on which the laws of fancy cease to apply.
The difficult and fragmentary distinction at the end of Volume I,
the key to his critical theories and the subject of much on-going
controversy, has its origins, then, in his ambivalent relations to Har
tleyan associationism as much as in his initial response to Words
worth’s poetry. But instead of concisely setting forth the significance
of the former to his theory, Coleridge begins to lose himself in a
pedantic history of associationism; and this, as we discover to our
dismay, serves in turn only as the prelude to further digressions which
dramatize what Fruman has described as Coleridge’s “failures to
pursue an argument to a conclusion.” (Coleridge, the Damaged
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Archangel, p. 79) These failures are amply demonstrated in the five
chapters sandwiched between the three on association and the fancy
imagination paragraphs at the end of Volume I, and which reveal on a
large scale the collapse of the exposition in the first half of the
Biographia.
Coleridge widens the scope of his discussion in Chapter VIII,
beginning with “the system of Dualism introduced by Des Cartes”
and wending his way from Leibniz to Hylozoism. To compound the
problem that the center will not hold and that things are falling apart,
he employs a discursive style that comes close to being a parody of
philosophical argument. And he begins to digress even from his
digressions. Chapter IX opens with one of the unanswerable ques
tions: “Is philosophy possible as a science, and what are its condi
tions?” and proceeds to discourse on his intellectual obligations,
especially to the “Teutonic theosophist, Jacob Behmen,” and to the
illustrious sage of Koenigsberg, the founder of the Critical Philo
sophy,” the “clearness and evidence” of whose works “took posses
sion” of Coleridge’ mind “as with a giant’s hand.” (p. 84) From thence
he proceeds to the thorny problem of his borrowings from the Ger
mans, only to conclude with the famous disclaimer, “I regard truth as
divine ventriloquist” — another instance of Coleridge giving himself
a blank check. Having trekked to Chapter X, we discover that he drops
all pretence of being still on target: “A chapter of digression and
anecdotes, as an interlude preceding that on the nature and genesis of
the imagination or plastic power.” After nearly forty pages of anec
dotes (the best about “Spy Nozy”) we arrive rather the worse for wear
at Chapter XI, only to be told that we are not, after all, to have the
promised chapter, but instead “an affectionate exhortation to those
who in early life feel themselves disposed to become authors.” And
once we have finished this,, we find that Coleridge disappoints us
further with the delaying action of “a chapter of requests and premo
nitions [only too well founded] concerning, the perusal of omission of
the chapter that follows.” One does not have to read it to realize that
by now his prolonged stalling has become absurd.
Chapter XII is a prime example of Coleridgean mystification. He
opens by putting the reader in his place with the maxim, “until you
understand a writer’s ignorance, presume yourself ignorant of his
understanding.” (p. 134) With that put-down of his audience, he goes
on to request that the reader “will either pass over the following
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Chapter altogether or read the whole connectedly. The fairest part of
the most beautiful body will appear deformed and monstrous if disse
vered from its place in the organic whole.” (p. 135) With this caution
ary preamble, Coleridge enters on an obscure rehash of the
subject-object dilemma of modern philosophy. Again the English
philosopher-poet seems a rickety imitation of the German idealists. In
reading it one is reminded of Carlyle’s account of Coleridge’s conver
sation, or of Byron’s description (in the Preface of Don Juan) of
Coleridge as “a hawk encumbered by his hood, — / Explaining meta
physics to the nation — / I wish he would explain his Explanation.”
Chapter XII culminates with ten heavily inflated “Theses” to sustain
those “readers who are willing to accompany” him “through the
following chapter, in which the results will be applied to the deduction
of the imagination.” (p. 149) But this is followed by a digression on
Coleridge’s disagreement with Wordsworth’s views on the imagina
tion (in the Preface of 1815). And then, finally, after the hundred-odd
pages of digression subsequent to the end of Chapter IV, where he
announced his intent to “deduce” the imagination, Coleridge will
begin “Chapter XIII On the imagination, or esemplastic power.” The
issue is at hand.

IV
I have traced Coleridge’s labyrinthine build-up to this chapter of
chapters, the intended pivotal point of the two volumes of Biographia
Literaria, because I think an overview of his expository method is
essential to our perception of how his attempt there to make good on
his promises disintegrates quite absurdly. In the actual organization
of its argument Chapter XIII deserves the close scrutiny Coleridge
had repeatedly asked for in the earlier sections, and one that is rarely
receives from commentators intent only to explain those enigmatic
passages at the end, often by simplifying whatever meaning they
have for the sake of a false textbook clarity.6 It opens with more
mystification in the form of several paragraphs on “the transcenden
tal philosophy” of “the venerable Sage of Koenigsberg.” Coleridge’
desire to lean on a philosophical father figure when the going gets
tough only serves to aggravate his difficulties, because the transcen
dental portions he serves up get increasingly indigestible, until we are
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mercifully released with the sudden collapse of a paragraph in the
middle of a sentence: “Now this tertium aliquid can be no other than
an inter-penetration of the counteracting powers, partaking of both.”
(p. 164) And here we are, dangling in the void of counteracting inter
penetration. Even Coleridge must have realized that the metaphysical
mumbo-jumbo that is to deduce the imagination was becoming pre
posterous.7 He was trapped, having written eight introductory chap
ters only to paint himself into a corner. But rather than face his
dilemma, Coleridge chooses to employ the rogue’s age-old gimmick for
squeezing out of a tight spot. He makes a forced exit with a rhetorical
sleight-of-hand:
Thus far had the work been transcribed the press, when I received the
following letter from a friend whose practical judgement I have ample
reason to estimate and revere, and whose taste and sensibility preclude
all the excuses which
self-love might possibly have prompted me to
set up in plea against the decision of advisers equal good
but
with less tact and feeling (p.164).

This bogus letter from an invented correspondent is a face-saving
device that renders the last chapter of Volume I ridiculous in a manner
reminiscent of the literary high jinks of Tristram Shandy. The
“friend” answers Coleridge’s request for his “opinion concerning your
Chapter on the Imagination, both as to the impressions it made on
myself and as to those which I think it will make on the public”
deferentially with the advice that it is much too difficult for the
benighted audience of the Biographia:
... as for the public, I do not hesitate a moment in advising and urging
you to withdraw the Chapter from the present work, and to reserve it for
your announced treatise the Logos or communicative intellect in Man
and Deity. First, because imperfectly as I understand the present Chap
ter, I see clearly that... you have
obliged to omit so many links
the necessity of compression, that what remains looks ...
the frag
ments of the winding steps of an old ruined tower (p. 166).

Coleridge’s ruin would strike the readers of his “literary life and
opinions” like “Bishop Berkeley’s Siris, announced as an Essay on
Tar-water, which beginning with Tar ends with the Trinity.”8 His
friend concludes by recommending that the imagination chapter be
deferred until “that greater work to which you have devoted so many
years, and study so intense and various,” where “it will be in its proper
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place.” The letter ends, as J. A. Appleyard puts it, with “Coleridge’s
expressions of good will toward himself’ (Coleridge's Philosophy of
Literature, p. 198): “All success attend you, for if hard thinking and
hard reading are merits you have deserved it.” Not surprisingly,
Coleridge is only too willing to accede to the plea to reserve his aborted
chapter for the “announced treatise on the Logos or communicative
Intellect in Man and Deity.”
What is particularly revealing about Coleridge’s practical joke of
a laudatory letter by himself to himself is that it allows him not merely
to squirm out of a tight spot, but that it aims, characteristically, to
enhance further his claims to being a profound thinker. He will have
his cake and eat it too: his dismal failure in the here and now as the
theorist of imagination will be more than compensated for by some
greater work in the future, by an all-encompassing Logos that will
turn relative defeat into absolute triumph. His philosophical preten
sions go from the absurd to the pathetic to the extent that he has partly
talked himself into believing them, for the imagination account of the
Biographia is almost as much a hoax on himself as on his public. For
the sake of shoring up his threatened sense of self-esteem, it is the
saving illusion he wanted to preserve. But as Appleyard points out,
“after the collapse of the argument in the first volume of the Biogra
phia Coleridge never again attempted a complete description of his
literary theories.” (Coleridge's Philosophy of Literature, p. 209).
Such is the intricate expository web in which the fancy
imagination paragraphs are entangled. By way of lead-in to those
celebrated pronouncements, Coleridge humbly concludes:
in consequence this very judicious letter, which produced complete
conviction in my mind, I shall content myself
the present with
stating the main result of the chapter, which I have reserved for that
future publication, a detailed prospectus of which the reader will find at
the close of the second volume (p. 176).

(It should not surprise us that the promised “prospectus” is nowhere to
be found in the Biographia.) After the famous definition of fancy and
imagination, Coleridge winds up the first volume with a pontifical
gesture:
Whatever more than this I shall think it fit to declare concerning the
powers and privileges of the imagination in the present work will be
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found in the critical essay on the uses of the supernatural in poetry and
the principles that regulate its introduction: which the reader will find
prefixed to the poem of The Ancient Mariner.

The essay on the supernatural too is nonextant, the notice of it being
part of the greater tissue of plagiarisms and histrionics that makes up
the last chapter of Volume I. As for Chapter XIII itself, aside from the
oft-quoted, enigmatic fancy-imagination paragraphs, it is both farci
cal and anticlimactic. Anyone who takes the trouble to examine its
actual contents or those of the digressive sections leading down to it
cannot take the claims of Coleridge the theorist of imagination at face
value.

V
Having suggested that whatever unity the Biographia may pos
sess lies in Coleridge’s conception alone, and not in his exposition of
the imagination theory, and having re-embodied the two paragraphs
usually disserved from the whole by plotting the actual structure of
the argument in volume I, I conclude with some general comments
about the Biographia as an expression of the Romantic sensibility
which reveals more of its weaknesses than its strengths.
Many Romantic works are built around a series of epiphanies (to
use Joyce’s term) and frequently build up to a plateau of sublime
feeling and perception that can have a cathartic effect. Perhaps this is
the literary equivalent of the grand finale in music, of the climactic
crescendo, which in some Romantic symphonies (Beethoven’s Ninth,
for instance) can have an overwhelming impact. The best example in
English Romantic poetry is probably the concluding book of Words
worth’ soul-biography, The Prelude, which with the Mount Snowdon
“spot of time” hymns majestically “the discipline and consummation
of a poet’s mind.” Other major instances that come readily to mind are
the conclusions of Blake’s Jerusalem, with its triumphant note of
alienation overcome (“All Human Forms identified”), and Shelley’s
Prometheus Unbound, where Demogorgon’ choric close is the philo
sophic climax to an entire act of epiphanic celebration. In German
Romanticism too, the final uplift is just as notable a feature, as mani
fest in the chant of the Chorus Mysticus at the conclusion of the
second part of Goethe’s Faust, or in the ending of Part I of Novalis’
Heinrich von Ofterdingen (which conjures with a visionary fable “the
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realm of eternity”), and the conclusion of his Hymns to Night with an
ecstatic unio mystica of love and death.
As a defining trait of many longer Romantic works, the final
epiphany serves both as a unifying perspective and a triumphant
finish — this is the way a positive Romantic ends, with a bang, and
not a whimper. Such an aesthetic mode has its dangers and pitfalls.
What if the grand conclusion is bungled? Even some of the best
Romantic writers come close to disappointing the readers’ aroused
expectations with a flat finish. Clearly this is one of Coleridge’s major
weaknesses. It has often been pointed out that he had trouble finish
ing what he started, and that some of his most famous compositions
are fragments — a not untypical situation, given the overweening and
grandiose ambitions of many Romantic artists. Of those he did com
plete, the most perfect is The Rime of the Ancient Mariner. But even
that nightmare of Life-in-Death has a rather prosaic ending with the
proverbial coda:
He prayeth best, who loveth best
All things both great and small;
For the dear God who loveth us,
He made and loveth all.

Like the conclusion of Wordsworth’s “Resolution and Independence,”
it has struck many readers as an anticlimactic homily which under
cuts the stature of the visionary experience that has preceded it.
When considered in terms of the epiphanic paradigm according to
which some of the best Romantic texts are structured, Coleridge’s
presentation of his theory of imagination in Biographia Literaria may
strike us not only as a dismal explanatory collapse, but also as a failed
epiphany. He falters at epic length in his theodicy of imagination,
only to abandon the reader in a rhetorical fog. Again the genius of
Wordsworth, whose life and work is closely intertwined with that of
STC, presents an interesting parallel and contrast. Like the Biogra
phia, The Prelude is a personal, digressive, miscellaneous and mean
dering work that has a way of getting lost in the turnings of its sinuous
structure. But where Wordsworth succeeds in the end with the breath
taking mountain vision that consummates the search for his poetic
identity and that embodies the higher unity of his development, con
ceived under the banner of imagination, Coleridge suffers a definitive
failure of vision in his concluding chapter “on the imagination.” The
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Mount Snowdon “spot of time,” after the monumental, epic questfor a
personal past, represents the true Romantic sublime; Coleridge’s
fancy-imagination paragraphs are the false sublime, the ruins — and
runes — of a failed vision after a long and fruitless quest. In a sense we
are back to the loss of his “shaping spirit of Imagination” lamented
much earlier in “Dejection: An Ode.” The fundamental irony of Cole
ridge’s failed quest in Biographia Literaria is that without the aid and
guidance of the spirit that forms unity out of multeity, the poet
philosopher of imagination can hardly expound a theory of the imagi
nation. Instead of the illuminations of esemplastic power, Coleridge
only serves up (to recur to the words of “Dejection”) the regurgitations
of “abstruse research” that has stolen from his “own nature all the
natural man,” having by now become the confirmed “habit” of his
soul. Thus, the imagination quest of Coleridge’s literary self-portrait,
pursued a decade and a half after the prophetic grief of his great ode,
attests on a massive scale to the collapse of his “genial spirits.”

NOTES
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